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Abstract 
East Asian countries have traditionally been recognized as prioritizing sovereignty over 
democracy and human rights norms in their foreign policies. However, this 
sovereignty-weighted approach appears to have changed somewhat since the mid-2000s as 
East Asian democracies such as Japan and Indonesia have upgraded their support for 
democracy abroad. These countries began sharing their own experiences with democratization 
and providing the capacity-building assistance necessary for the operation of democratic 
institutions as well as material and financial assistance for elections, state institutions, and civil 
society organizations that promote democratic governance. This paper examines the state of 
and the motivations for their support of democracy, positioning the work as a pilot study from 
which to make an argument applicable to, and testable with, the cases of democracy support by 
other third-generation democracy promoters.  
This paper argues that the support from Japan and Indonesia for democracy has significant 
commonalities not only in terms of the timing of its emergence, but also in terms of content, 
and that both countries use regime-compatible approaches. Concerning the motivations behind 
support for democracy, the paper argues that while democratic norms function as the 
background identity of the countries, they are not explanatory variables. Rather, the two 
countries commonly began supporting democracy strategically as a foreign policy tool: 
Indonesia intended to expand its international influence to match its rising international status 
as a middle-income country, and Japan sought to strengthen its own ties with the US and to 
expand its influence vis-à-vis China at the time of its declining international status. In other 
words, the two countries’ strategic incentives were motivated by the tectonic shift in the 
international power structure, which thus functions as the independent variable while the 
strategic incentives can be identified as intervening variables. 
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1. Introduction 
1.1 Rising Threats to Democracy 
Democracy has weakened internationally over the past decade. Globalization and the resulting 
expansion of the economic gap in societies have led to a surge of frustration, which manifests in 
various forms such as nativism/anti-immigration and anti-establishmentarianism. Political 
leaders and parties which claim to achieve change “on their own” in an authoritarian and 
anti-institutional manner enjoy a wide range of political support, which has led to the surge in 
populist politicians such as Donald Trump in the United States, and populist political parties in 
Europe such as Alternative for Germany (Germany), ANO 2011 (Czech Republic), the Five Star 
Movement (Italy), and Lega (Italy). The push for Brexit has been led by populist leaders as 
well.1  
These phenomena are also seen in the Asia–Pacific. A typical example, the Philippines, 
has been experiencing a huge impact from populism. Out of frustration with the high 
unemployment rate and rising income gap, that country chose Rodrigo Duterte, a populist 
politician with an image of powerful leadership despite his problematic human rights record, for 
the presidency in 2016. This led to a serious surge in extra-judicial killings in Duterte’s “war on 
drugs” and life-threating intimidation against journalists covering the topic, including the arrest 
of the prominent anti-governmental journalist Maria Ressa of the online news site Rappler. 
This trend is not unique to the Philippines; other governments in the region have also 
strengthened control over the media and NGOs, shrinking space for the activities of domestic 
NGOs, banning international funding for domestic NGOs, pushing international NGOs out of 
                                            
1 There are numerous works on populism and its damaging impact on democracy. See, for example, Cas 
Mudde, Populist radical right parties in Europe (NY: Cambridge University Press, 2007); Marc F. 
Plattner, ‘Populism, pluralism, and liberal democracy’, Journal of Democracy 21: 1, January 2010, pp. 
81–92; Yascha Mounk, ‘Pitchfork politics: the populist threat to liberal democracy’, Foreign Affairs 93: 
5, September/October 2014, pp. 27–36; William A. Galston, ‘The populist challenge to liberal 
democracy’, Journal of Democracy 29: 2, April 2018, pp. 5–19; Francis Fukuyama, Identity: the 
demand for dignity and the politics of resentment (New York: Farrar, Straus and Giroux, 2018). 
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their country, weakening or forcing the demise of opposition parties, and closing down 
independent media outlets.2  They create laws for such control, shifting from the “rule of law”, 
which is one of the core tenets of democratic governance, to “rule by law” based on their 
political leaders’ arbitrary decisions. The spread of populism has also exacerbated religion-based 
and ethnically based discrimination such as that against the Rohingya in Myanmar, against the 
Christians in Indonesia, and against the Muslims in India, impacting on election results as well. 
Such election results seem to be delegitimizing democracy in the eyes of many reviewers, 
causing them to ask if democracy is the problem.3  
China and Russia have added fuel to the fire by manipulating information through media, 
academia, think tanks, and governments around the world to attack democracy and spread 
authoritarian ways of governance.4  Various studies and newspapers have suggested that China 
has meddled in politics and elections in regional countries such as Australia, Cambodia, and 
Taiwan.5  While Malaysia began the democratic transition process in 2018, that is nearly the 
only recent positive move toward democracy in Asia. In the rest of the region, serious challenges 
to the liberal international order—which is based on such values as human rights and democracy 
among others—continue. The Economist Intelligence Unit states that, since 2016, Asia has been 
                                            
2 See, for example, CIVICUS, CIVICUS monitor: tracking civil space, https://monitor.civicus.org/; 
Human Rights Watch, World report 2019: events of 2018, 2019, 
https://www.hrw.org/sites/default/files/world_report_download/hrw_world_report_2019.pdf 
3 Thomas Carothers, ‘Is democracy the problem?’ The American Interest, 16 January 2019; Richard 
Wike, Laura Silver, and Alexandra Castillo, ‘Many across the globe are dissatisfied with how 
democracy is working’, Pew Research Center, 29 April 2019. 
4 Larry Diamond, Marc F. Plattner, and Christopher Walker, Authoritarianism goes global (Baltimore: 
Johns Hopkins University Press, 2016); Juan Pablo Cardenal et al., Sharp power (Washington DC: 
National Endowment for Democracy, 2017); Samuel C. Woolley and Philip N. Howard, ‘Computational 
propaganda worldwide: executive summary’, Working Paper 2017.11 (Oxford, UK: Project on 
Computational Propaganda, 2017); Arch Puddington and Tyler Roylance, ‘The dual threat of populists 
and autocrats’, Journal of Democracy 28: 2, April 2017, pp. 105–19; Daniel Fried and Alina Polyakova, 
Democratic defence against disinformation (Washington DC: Atlantic Council, 2018); Larry Diamond, 
Ill winds: Saving democracy from Russian rage, Chinese ambition, and American complacency (New 
York: Penguin Press, 2019). 
5 See, for example, Clive Hamilton, Silent invasion: China’s influence in Australia (Melbourne: Hardie 
Grant Books, 2018); Scott Henderson et al., ‘Chinese espionage group TEMP Periscope targets 
Cambodia ahead of July 2018 elections and reveals broad operations globally’, FireEye, 10 July 2018; A 
special volume on China’s ‘sharp power’ and Taiwan’s democracy, Taiwan Strategists 1 (March 2019). 
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the world region facing the most serious deterioration of democracy.6  Finally, despite the 
increased threats to democracy, the US, which has been the underwriter of democracy 
internationally since the end of the Second World War, has become increasingly inward-looking 
due to populism, and its interest in supporting democracy abroad has declined, exerting a 
negative symbolic impact.7  
This reality poses a threat to regional countries, and particularly to regional democracies, 
given that they have maintained economic growth and political stability thanks to the liberal 
international order. It is imperative for the regional populace in general, and regional 
democracies especially, to maintain and support the liberal international order that upholds 
universal values such as freedom, democracy, human rights, and the rule of law. 
 
1.2 Research Question 
A beacon of hope is that some relatively new democracies outside of the Western world have 
joined the effort to support democracy as third-generation democracy promoters.8  However, 
when it comes to East Asia, which includes both North and South East Asia,9  the regional 
countries have traditionally been recognized to prioritize sovereignty over liberal values in their 
foreign policies. Looking at individual countries in the region, democracies in Thailand (albeit 
                                            
6 Economist Intelligence Unit, ‘Democracy index 2017’, 2018, p. 25. 
7 Thomas Carothers, Democracy promotion under Trump, Carnegie Endowment for International Peace, 
6 September 2017; Frances Z. Brown and Thomas Carothers, ‘Is the new U.S. national security strategy 
a step backward on democracy and human rights?’, Washington DC: Carnegie Endowment for 
International Peace, 3 January 2018; Thomas Carothers and Frances Z. Brown, ‘Can U.S. democracy 
policy survive Trump?’, Washington DC: Carnegie Endowment for International Peace, 1 October 2018. 
8 On non-Western democracy promoters, see, for example, Thomas Carothers and Richard Youngs, 
‘Looking for help’, The Carnegie Papers (Washington DC: Carnegie Endowment for International 
Peace, 2011); Ted Piccone, Five rising democracies: and the fate of the international liberal order 
(Washington DC: Brookings Institution Press, 2016); Richard Youngs, Upholding democracy in a 
post-Western order, Washington DC: Carnegie Endowment for International Peace, February 13, 2019. 
9 Although some observers understand the geographic concept of East Asia as the region covering the 
Northeast Asian region only, this paper uses it as the regional concept covering both the Northeast and 
Southeast Asian regions. Such understanding is frequently used in previous works, including Larry 
Crissman, ‘The physical and ethnic geography of East and Southeast Asia’, in Colin Mackerras, ed., 
East and Southeast Asia: a multidisciplinary survey (Boulder, Colo.: Lynne Rienner Publishers, 1995), 
or even in the East Asia Summit. 
 
5 
 
intermittently) and the Philippines have been too fragile to support democracies abroad. While 
the East Asia Institute, a South Korean independent think tank, has been the headquarter for the 
Asia Democracy Research Network and has fostered research relevant to the support of 
democracy, the South Korean government itself shies away from supporting democracy abroad.  
On the other hand, two countries in the region, Japan and Indonesia, have upgraded their 
support for democracy abroad since the mid-2000s. With the rise of awareness about the 
importance of a “hybrid approach” that takes into account local knowledge and blends it with 
liberal values in supporting other countries’ nation-building, the importance of non-Western 
regional actors is on the rise.10  Thus, the support for democracy offered by these two countries 
could be a positive factor at a time of grave threat to democracy in East Asia. But why is it that 
Japan and Indonesia, among their hesitant East Asian neighbours, emerged as supporters of 
democracy abroad at a similar time? This is an interesting and intriguing question for three 
reasons. First, the lack of uniformity among East Asian democracies in engaging in the support 
of democracy indicates that the rising number of requests for such support in the region does not 
explain this variance, for if this were so, other East Asian democracies would have commenced 
such support activities as well.  
Second, the timing factor is also quite a puzzle considering the reputation of democracy 
support. Negative opinions about such support were strengthened due to the American war 
against Iraq in the mid-2000s.11  It became harder not only for Western countries but also for 
international institutions to continue supporting democracy, and organizations offering such 
                                            
10 Research on hybrid peace abounds. A seminal work includes Oliver Richmond, Post-liberal peace 
(New York and London: Routledge, 2012). 
11 Arthur A. Goldsmith, ‘Making the world safe for partial democracy? Questioning the premises of 
democracy promotion’, International Security 33: 2, 2008, pp. 120–47; Christopher Hobson and Milja 
Kurki, eds., The conceptual politics of democracy promotion (London: Routledge, 2012); Piki 
Ish-Shalom, ‘Theory as a hermeneutical mechanism: the democratic peace thesis and the politics of 
democratization’, European Journal of International Relations 12: 4, 2006, pp. 565–98; Tony Smith, A 
pact with the devil: Washington’s bid for world supremacy and the betrayal of the American promise 
(London: Routledge, 2007); Laurence Whitehead, ‘Losing “the force”? The “dark side” of 
democratization after Iraq’, Democratization 16: 2, 2009, pp. 215–42. 
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support were harassed, refused cooperation, and expelled.12  Given the traditional emphasis that 
East Asian countries have placed on sovereignty norms, why both of these East Asian countries 
began engaging in the support of democracy at such a time—despite the increasingly negative 
image of such support as interference in domestic affairs—is intriguing.  
Third, differences in the international roles of Japan and Indonesia also make the 
similarity in timing of their entry into the support of democracy a matter of interest. Japan as a 
major power has played an essential role in international and regional stability. It has supported 
economic stability and growth in developing countries as a foreign aid donor since the 
mid-1950s, and played a substantial role in the establishment of the Asian Development Bank in 
the mid-1960s. Japan’s role in the maintenance of multilateralism and the liberal order became 
more distinct after the Cold War; the country took the initiatives to establish regional institutions 
such as the Asia–Pacific Economic Cooperation and the ASEAN Regional Forum around 1990, 
and contributed to the economic stability of Asian countries after the Asian Financial Crisis in 
1997. Recently, Japan took the initiative in concluding the Trans-Pacific Partnership after US 
President Donald Trump announced that the US would withdraw from that agreement, which 
placed it in danger of dissolution. 
On the other hand, Indonesia is an emerging power, and its international role and 
influence have been limited to date. Although it was one of the central countries in the 
Non-Aligned Movement during the early Cold War era and is a major power within Southeast 
Asia today, its limited economic and military capabilities have inhibited the country from 
exerting as much influence as Japan has in the international scene. It is an interesting 
phenomenon that these two countries with different material capabilities and different historical 
international roles began constructive engagement for democracy at a similar point in time.  
                                            
12 On the issue of closing space, see, for example, Carl Gershman and Michael Allen, ‘The assault on 
democracy assistance’, Journal of Democracy 17: 2, April 2006, pp. 36–51; Thomas Carothers and 
Saskia Brechenmacher, Closing space: democracy and human rights support under fire (Washington,  
DC: Carnegie Endowment for International Peace, 2014). 
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1.3 Existing Literature 
The existing literature on rising democracies is not generally well suited for explaining the 
causes of this similarity. Although there are studies on Indonesia’s and Japan’s respective 
support for democracy, none of them examine this interesting overlap of timing.13  
According to some, newly democratized countries find similarities between the 
political situations they themselves faced before their democratic transition, and those in 
neighbouring non-democratic or transitioning countries. Consequently, newly democratized 
countries feel a sense of obligation in that they are in the best position to assist and share their 
recent experience with their neighbours due to the seeming transferability of that experience.14  
However, this tendency does not explain why Japan did not begin supporting democracy 
abroad during the early Cold War period or why these two East Asian democracies began 
supporting democracy after quite different lengths of time following their own 
democratization. 
Scholars such as Peter Burnell and Jonas Wolff categorize the motivations for 
democracy support into the following five types: the existence of domestic liberal norms, the 
victory of democracy with the end of the Cold War, increased demands due to the spread of 
democratization, the intention to legitimize foreign and domestic politics, and the rise of good 
governance discourse.15  Among these five factors, three—the end of the Cold War, the 
                                            
13 Maiko Ichihara, Japan’s international democracy assistance as soft power: neoclassical realist 
analysis (New York and London: Routledge, 2018); Maiko Ichihara, Japan’s strategic approach to 
democracy support, Washington DC: Carnegie Endowment for International Peace, 7 March 2014; 
Maiko Ichihara, ‘Understanding Japanese democracy assistance’, The Carnegie Papers, 25 March 2013; 
Rizal Sukma, ‘Do new democracies support democracy? Indonesia finds a new voice’, Journal of 
Democracy 22: 4, October 2011, pp. 110–23; Evan A. Laksmana, ‘Indonesia’s rising regional and global 
profile: does size really matter?’, Contemporary Southeast Asia 33: 2, August 2011, pp. 157–82; Ann 
Marie Murphy, ‘Democratization and Indonesian foreign policy: implications for the United States’, 
Asia Policy 13, January 2012; Moch Faisal Karim, ‘Role conflict and the limits of state identity: the case 
of Indonesia in democracy promotion’, The Pacific Review 30: 3, 2017, pp. 385–404. 
14 Tsveta Petrova, From solidarity to geopolitics (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2014). 
15 Peter Burnell, ‘Democracy assistance: origins and organizations’, in Peter Burnell, ed., Democracy 
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increased demand for democracy support, and the rise of good governance discourse—do not 
function as explanatory variables for Indonesia’s and Japan’s support of democracy. It was 
nearly 20 years after the end of the Cold War that the two countries upgraded their support for 
democracy. Thus, although the end of the Cold War might have facilitated that support as a 
background environmental factor, it was not a variable. The increased demand for support does 
not seem to explain the actions of the two countries either, given that it was from the 
mid-1980s to the late 1990s, not in the 2000s, that East Asia experienced a tide of 
democratization. Good governance discourse arose from the late 1980s to the early 1990s and 
is well suited for explaining the support for democracy provided by developed Western 
democracies as core members of the international aid community. As a member of this 
community, Japan was influenced by the rise of good governance discourse. However, its 
attention to democracy was inconspicuous throughout the 1990s, and it was only in the 2000s 
that Japan’s support was upgraded. Furthermore, Indonesia is not a developed democracy or a 
traditional foreign aid donor. Thus, the good governance discourse is also not a good fit for 
explaining the two countries’ support for democracy.  
Therefore, this paper examines whether the two remaining factors—normative factors 
(domestic liberal norms) and strategic factors (intention to legitimize foreign and domestic 
politics)—explain the two countries’ support for democracy. The argument is as follows: while 
the two countries possess democratic norms, these norms only facilitated the background 
conditions for the support of democracy and did not function as an independent variable. Also, 
even though strategic factors prompted the two countries to engage in such support, it was 
rather an intervening variable that was influenced by an international power shift and the 
change in the countries’ positions in the international structure. 
                                                                                                                                
assistance (London and Portland, OR: Frank Cass, 2000), pp. 39–44; Jonas Wolff, ‘From the unity of 
goodness to conflicting objectives’, in Timm Beichelt et al., eds., Civil society and democracy promotion 
(New York, NY: Palgrave Macmillan, 2014), pp. 71–2. 
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This study serves as a pilot study for understanding third-generation democracy 
promoters in general. The study suggests that any country with democratic norms, relatively 
large material capabilities, and a change in its relative power position in the international 
power structure, could seek to use support for democracy as a foreign policy tool for greater 
influence. 
In what follows, this paper first describes the content of Indonesia’s and Japan’s 
support for democracy. The second part examines their motivations for offering such support, 
focusing on the timing of their change in rhetoric in the mid-2000s. Given the commonality of 
the outcome (i.e., beginning of their support for democracy at a similar time) despite the 
significant differences in their international roles, this paper utilizes J.S. Mill’s method of 
agreement in conducting this comparative case study, and analyses the common factors that 
explain the two countries’ engagement in the support of democracy. Data used are from 
government publications, public statements of political leaders, survey data on democracy, 
newspaper articles, interviews with major policy-makers, and secondary sources. 
 
2. The Content of Democracy Support 
2.1 Indonesia 
Indonesia’s democratic transition began in 1998, and the administration of Bacharuddin Jusuf 
Habibie, the first after the end of Suharto’s authoritarian rule, repeatedly described Indonesia as 
“the third largest democracy in the world”. However, it was not until the Susilo Bambang 
Yudhoyono administration that Indonesia began supporting democracy abroad, and such support 
only became one of the major areas of cooperation for the country from the mid-2000s onwards. 
The country first began using diplomatic measures for that purpose in the mid-2000s and 
expanded this instrument to the South–South and Triangular Cooperation (SSTC) in 
approximately 2010. 
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2.1.1 Diplomacy 
The main arena for Indonesia’s multilateral efforts for the support of democracy is ASEAN, the 
Association of Southeast Asian Nations. ASEAN has underscored the principle of 
non-interference in domestic affairs and has stayed away from the issues of democracy and 
human rights since its establishment in 1967. However, in 2003, Indonesia, as the chair of 
ASEAN, proposed the establishment of the ASEAN Security Community, which emphasizes 
democracy and human rights protection. In 2007, Indonesia played a vital role in inserting text 
on the protection of democracy and human rights into the preamble of the ASEAN Charter. 
Although the sanction measures for failure to abide by these frameworks that were 
recommended by the Eminent Persons Group were not included in the finalized Charter,16  this 
was still a significant new step for ASEAN, whose members include non-democratic countries.  
Indonesia’s support for democracy is not confined to Southeast Asia. In 2008, the 
Indonesian government launched the Bali Democracy Forum (BDF) as an intergovernmental 
forum on democracy that encouraged dialogue and cooperation among regional governments 
and beyond. 17   President Yudhoyono and Foreign Minister Hassan Wirajuda cautiously 
organized the forum to function as a venue for lesson-sharing and discussion rather than as a 
setting in which democracies would teach non-democracies.18  Although criticism persists that 
the BDF is only a talk shop that has not achieved much concrete success,19  it was designed 
based on the belief that maintaining dialogue increases the possibilities for non-democratic 
countries to share issues that they face regarding governance. 
                                            
16 The ASEAN Charter, preamble; Takeshi Yuasa, The establishment of the ASEAN Charter and its 
significance [in Japanese], The Japan Institute of International Affairs, 25 February 2008, 
http://www.jiia.or.jp/column/200802/25-yuzawa_takeshi.html. 
17 Dewi Fortuna Anwar, ‘The Impact of Domestic and Asian Regional Changes on Indonesian Foreign 
Policy’, Southeast Asian Affairs 2010, pp. 135–6. 
18 See, for example, KEMLU and IPD, Speeches and proceedings: Bali Democracy Forum “Building 
and consolidating democracy: a strategic agenda for Asia”, Bali, Indonesia, 10–11 December 2008, pp. 
5–6, http://www.ipd.or.id/wp-content/uploads/2013/09/Speeches-and-Proceedings-of-BDF-I.pdf. 
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The avoidance of the application of outright pressure is seen in bilateral relations as well. 
During the alleged election fraud in Cambodia or the coup d’état and establishment of a military 
regime in Thailand in 2014, the Indonesian government remained silent. In addition, the 
Yudhoyono administration asked the international community to have patience with Myanmar 
during the country’s junta years. Behind the scenes, however, Yudhoyono conducted a quiet 
diplomacy of persuasion, had periodic personal correspondence with the leaders of Myanmar’s 
military, dispatched retired Lieutenant General Agus Widjojo to Myanmar as a special envoy, 
and persuaded Myanmar to improve its human rights record, release Aung San Suu Kyi, and 
democratize.20  As such, Indonesia’s democracy diplomacy takes what Sarah Bush calls a 
“regime-compatible” approach, by collaborating with local governmental actors and avoiding 
pushing for regime change.21 
 
2.1.2 Official Development Assistance 
Indonesia has also promoted democracy through the SSTC since the beginning of the 2010s. In 
2011, the Indonesian government announced flagship programmes for South–South cooperation 
for 2011–14, and one such programme focused on democracy and governance. 22   In a 
high-level meeting on SSTC entitled “Towards Country-Led Knowledge Hubs” held in Bali, 
Indonesia, in July 2012, the Indonesian government also expressed its intention to contribute to 
the topics of democracy, law enforcement, and peacekeeping, as it regards these as areas in 
which the country possesses a comparative advantage.23  
  
                                                                                                                                
19 Karim, Role conflict and the limits of state identity, p. 397. 
20 Karim, Role conflict and the limits of state identity, p. 398. 
21 Sarah Bush, The taming of democracy assistance: why democracy promotion does not confront 
dictators (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2015). 
22 Rd. Siliwanti, Indonesia South–South and triangular cooperation, p. 12, 
https://www.cbd.int/financial/southsouth/Indonesia-south.pdf. 
23 Siliwanti, Indonesia south–south and triangular cooperation, p. 13. 
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The Directorates of Technical Cooperation and Public Diplomacy within the Ministry of 
Foreign Affairs (Kementerian Luar Negeri: KEMLU) support democracy abroad, among which 
the Technical Cooperation Directorate has a budget for democracy assistance. Although the 
budget size is not known, it is probably quite limited given that the entire foreign aid of the 
KEMLU between 2000 and 2015 totalled only US$57.4 million.24  Most of the KEMLU’s 
democracy support is conducted through triangular cooperation schemes.25  
Japan played a role in expanding Indonesia’s democracy assistance. Indonesia’s SSTC, 
which was originally coordinated by the Coordinating Committee of International Technical 
Cooperation headed by the Ministry of State Secretariat, became dysfunctional after the Asian 
Financial Crisis due to the weakened interest in international cooperation in the process of 
rebuilding the national economy. Thus, based on an umbrella agreement on triangular 
cooperation in 2008, the Japan International Cooperation Agency (JICA) assisted with the 
institutionalization and systematization of Indonesia’s knowledge among Indonesian 
governmental institutions, which can be shared with other countries through the SSTC, and one 
such understanding was Indonesia’s experience with democratization.26  Several triangular 
cooperation projects have been conducted between Japan, Indonesia, and third countries every 
year since then in the field of democracy and governance. 
Various Indonesian civil society actors are involved in democracy support. One of these 
that functions as a primary policy instrument for democracy assistance is the Institute for Peace 
and Democracy (IPD). The IPD was established with Foreign Minister Wirajuda’s initiative in 
2008 as a non-governmental organization and as the implementer of the BDF.27  By establishing 
it as an independent NGO, Wirajuda secured the IPD’s institutional survival regardless of the 
                                            
24 National coordination team of south-south cooperation, Annual report of Indonesia’s south-south and 
triangular cooperation (SSTC) 2016, p.9. http://open_jicareport.jica.go.jp/pdf/12315719.pdf. 
25 From high-ranking officials of KEMLU, in an interview with the author, 29 August 2017. 
26 JICA, Indonesia–Japan: fostering global development, 11 October 2013, 
https://www.jica.go.jp/indonesia/english/office/others/c8h0vm00008m7xt9-att/Development.pdf. 
27 From a senior IPD staff member, in an interview with the author, 24 August 2017. 
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administration in charge,28  and made the IPD a part of his “total diplomacy” initiative of 
expanding the participation of external actors in foreign policy making. 29   The physical 
facilities of the IPD were constructed with funding from the Ministry of Education. 
Expanding from being a mere implementation arm of the BDF, the IPD has assisted 
democracy abroad. Although no governmental funding scheme is attached to its activities, 
Wirajuda, as a patron, and retired Lieutenant General Agus Widjojo, as the chairman of the IPD, 
connect the IPD with the Indonesian government. Furthermore, Wirajuda’s KEMLU reform, 
which gave greater discretion to ambassadors, made it possible for Indonesian embassies to 
work with the IPD at their own discretion in project-creation processes. The IPD thus functions 
as a de facto foreign policy instrument for the Indonesian government.30  
While not necessarily using “democracy” as an umbrella term (it focuses more on the 
technical aspects necessary for democratic development, including state institution reform, 
government accountability, political party reform, parliamentary reform, media training, 
accountability, responsiveness, and checks and balances), the IPD shares Indonesia’s 
democratization experience with other ASEAN countries (such as Cambodia, Laos, Myanmar, 
and Vietnam) as well as extra-regional states in the Pacific (such as Fiji) and in the Middle East 
(such as Tunisia and Egypt). While including actors that tend to be targeted in 
non-regime-compatible approaches to assistance with democracy, such as political parties and 
the media, 31   Indonesia focuses on lesson-sharing and thus its activities take a 
regime-compatible approach. 
Various Indonesian actors, ranging from governmental organizations (e.g., the National 
Election Committee, the Audit Board of the Republic of Indonesia, and the Corruption 
                                            
28 From a senior IPD staff member, in an interview with the author, 25 August 2017. 
29 Greta Nabbs-Keller, ‘Reforming Indonesia’s foreign ministry’, Contemporary Southeast Asia 35: 1, 
2013, pp. 68–70. 
30 From a senior IPD staff member, in an interview with the author, 25 August 2017. 
31 Bush, The taming of democracy assistance. 
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Eradication Commission) to political parties (e.g., Indonesian Democratic Party of Struggle, 
National Awakening Party, and Golkar), civil society organizations (e.g., Indonesia Corruption 
Watch), and media (e.g., the Indonesian Press Council, Alliance of Independent Journalists, and 
TEMPO), in addition to academics in the field, have participated in sharing their experiences. 
The targets for IPD assistance include government officials, members of legislatures and 
political parties, civil society leaders, media personnel, officials in the development field, and 
academics.32  
Compared to Yudhoyono, Joko Widodo (Jokowi), who came to the presidency in 2014, 
weakened the democratic rhetoric in his foreign policy statements.33  However, bringing his 
pragmatism to bear on support for democracy, Jokowi conveyed the understanding that 
democracy delivers economic benefits. Based on this understanding, he created policies with 
nine goals (Nawa cita), one of which is to strengthen Indonesia’s role in international and 
regional cooperation, especially in fields related to democracy.34   
 
2.2 Japan 
Attention to democracy appeared earlier in the case of Japan. The Official Development 
Assistance (ODA) Charter of 1992 stated that Japan would pay attention to the state of 
democratization and the human rights of aid recipients in providing foreign aid.35  The Japanese 
government also announced the “Partnership for Democratic Development” in 1996 to show that 
it had assisted and would continue to assist democracy abroad.36  However, its commitment to 
                                            
32 IPD, Comprehensive program report 2012, pp. 1 and 4. 
http://www.ipd.or.id/wp-content/uploads/2013/09/Comprehensive-Program-Report-2012.pdf. 
33 From a senior KEMLU staff member, in an interview with the author, 29 August 2017; From a senior 
SETNEG staff member, in an interview with the author, 30 August 2017. 
34 National coordination team of South–South cooperation, Annual report of Indonesia’s South–South 
and triangular cooperation, p.37. 
35 Ministry of Foreign Affairs of Japan (MOFA), Japan’s Official Development Assistance Charter, 30 
June 1992, http://www.mofa.go.jp/policy/oda/summary/1999/ref1.html. 
36 MOFA, Official Development Assistance (ODA): partnership for democratic development, 
http://www.mofa.go.jp/policy/oda/category/democratiz/1999/partner.html. 
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the support of democracy was thin in terms of both rhetoric and substance, and its assistance 
remained inconspicuous in the 1990s.37  
The Japanese government changed its tone in 2006. Foreign Minister Taro Aso launched 
the concept of the “Arc of Freedom and Prosperity” (AFP) and stressed Japan’s commitment to 
values-based diplomacy as a way of spreading universal values such as democracy, the rule of 
law, market economy, and human rights. 38   Since then, and especially during the 
administrations of Shinzo Abe and Taro Aso (2006–2008 and 2012–present), Japan has 
emphasized its commitment to supporting democracy abroad in major documents on its foreign 
and security policies, such as the National Security Strategy, the Diplomatic Bluebooks, and in 
ODA White Papers.39  The instruments employed to provide assistance have included using 
ODA and diplomacy. 
 
2.2.1 Official Development Assistance 
Reflecting the Japanese government’s emphasis on promoting democracy through ODA 
provision, the ODA allocation for this task was significantly increased in the mid-2000s. While 
quantitative data cannot capture the entire picture of Japan’s assistance for democracy, the ODA 
data from the Development Assistance Committee of the OECD for “151: I.5.a. Government & 
Civil Society-general, Total” help shows the overall trend. The main target sectors for assistance 
with democracy are elections, state institutions, and civil society sectors, according to Thomas 
Carothers—sectors that are all covered in the data provided.40  While Japanese officials argue 
that assistance for development and security is also a kind of support for democracy, this paper 
                                            
37 Ichihara, ‘Understanding Japanese democracy assistance’. 
38 MOFA, Arc of Freedom and Prosperity: Japan’s expanding diplomatic horizons, 30 Nov. 2006, 
http://www.mofa.go.jp/announce/fm/aso/speech0611.html. 
39 However, the administration of the Democratic Party of Japan from 2009 to 2012 also underscored 
the importance of democracy in their foreign policy, and thus this values-based diplomacy is not solely 
an LDP characteristic. Yuichi Hosoya, ‘The rise and fall of Japan’s grand strategy: the ‘Arc of Freedom 
and Prosperity’ and the future Asian order’, Asia-Pacific Review 18: 1, 2011, pp. 13–24. 
40 Thomas Carothers, Aiding democracy abroad: the learning curve (Washington, DC: Carnegie 
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focuses on more direct assistance for governance and civil society, for comparison with the 
Indonesian case. 
According to the data, while the aid amount for these sectors in total was only US$146.8 
million in 2003, it has expanded overall since then (to approximately US$250 million in both 
2006 and 2007, US$525 million in 2011, US$412 million in 2013, and more than US$300 
million per year in 2014–16), albeit with fluctuations (Figure 1). 
 
Figure 1 Gross disbursements of Japan’s ODA for democracy and governance (2000–
2016) 
(Unit: US Dollar, Millions; Current Prices) 
 
Source: 151: I.5.a. Government & Civil Society-general in the OECD, Creditor Reporting System (data 
extracted on March 23, 2018). 
 
Like the Indonesian case, Japan’s assistance for democracy takes a regime-compatible 
approach. Capacity-building assistance to state institutions for the purpose of helping to bring 
good and democratic governance is where Japan directs most of its energy. Instead of 
differentiating assistance for democratic governance from that for good governance, Japan 
                                                                                                                                
Endowment for International Peace, 1999), pp. 88 and 125–244. 
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positions good governance and democracy as short-term and longer-term purposes of the same 
aid projects. 41   While Japan began providing ODA for state institutions to support good 
governance in the 1990s, the ODA amount expanded with the added commitment to democracy 
from 2006. Although the aid amount for state institutions dropped briefly in 2009 and 2010 
reflecting a change in the governing party in Japan, the ODA amount for state institutions 
expanded once again in 2011 (Figure 1). 
Rule-of-law assistance is another area of emphasis for Japan, and ODA allocation for 
legal and judicial development expanded drastically in the 2010s (Figure 1). Japan’s legal 
assistance, which includes the aim of helping to develop liberal economic systems, began in 
1994, and since then Japan has provided legal assistance to countries such as Cambodia, China, 
Cote d’Ivoire, the Democratic Republic of Congo, Kyrgyzstan, Kazakhstan, Indonesia, Iran, 
Laos, Mongolia, Myanmar, Nepal, Tajikistan, Timor-Leste, Uzbekistan, and Vietnam. Whereas 
most legal assistance projects in the 1990s focused on the civil and economic law sectors, recent 
projects are increasingly positioning this assistance as a tool to help bring democracy in the long 
run. Assistance with the mediation system in Indonesia (2007–2010) and for the Supreme Court 
and the Attorney General’s Office of Myanmar (2013–) are typical examples of this. In addition, 
while the Japanese government used the term “legal assistance” until the early 2010s, it began 
using the term “rule of law assistance” beginning with the second Abe administration, to reflect 
that foreign aid policies were now integrated as a part of diplomacy and that Japan intends to 
support the rule of law and not just legal technicalities.42  
                                            
41 However, the lack of evaluation about the impact of projects for the long-term purpose of support for 
democracy is occasionally criticized. For example, Yukio Takasu, in Japan’s Role in Strengthening Rule 
of Law and Democracy in Asia, a workshop held at the National Endowment for Democracy in 
Washington, DC, 5 December 2018; The Experts Group for the Reconsideration of Japan’s ODA and 
Democracy, ‘Proposal regarding Japan’s Official Development Assistance (ODA) and democracy’, 2 
July 2018. 
42 From high-ranking officials of MOFA, in an interview with the author, 26 July 2018. 
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Compared to these two target sectors, the aid distributed to sectors related to elections 
and civil society, which are the sectors necessary for substantial political changes and thus 
constitute a non-regime-compatible approach to democracy assistance, has expanded only on a 
small scale. While only US$0.4–1.2 million was dispersed to these sectors between 2003 and 
2005, the amount increased to US$11.1 million in 2007 and to US$42.5 million in 2010. The 
amount fluctuated between US$15 million and US$28 million thereafter but reached US$33.9 
million in 2015 and US$49.7 million in 2016. And while Japan supports legislatures and 
legislative staffers, it does not provide assistance for political parties to remain neutral 
politically.43  Japan has also intentionally avoided strengthening civil society in a manner that 
bypasses governments, in order not to cause lowered trust in governments or to destabilize 
governance. 44   Most of Japan’s assistance for civil society is thus provided in the 
socio-economic sectors. This reflects Japan’s attitude of respecting domestic stability for the 
overall welfare of the people in recipient countries while promoting democratic governance. 
Despite its stance on civil society assistance, Japan has emphasized media assistance. It 
is hard to quantify Japan’s media assistance for the promotion of democracy because Japan has 
assisted media since the 1990s as a part of its development assistance, and there has not been any 
substantial increase in the ODA allocation for media (Figure 2). Qualitatively speaking, however, 
Japan has been increasingly linking media assistance with the long-term aim of promoting 
democracy. This can be seen in the fact, for example, that in 2006 and 2012 JICA published 
reports on the role of media assistance towards long-term aims including good governance and 
democracy.45  Strong emphasis on the long-term purpose of promoting democracy promotion 
can be found in some recent cases of media assistance to countries such as Myanmar (2013–) 
                                            
43 Ichihara, Japan's international democracy assistance, chapter 3. 
44 JICA, Governance assistance at JICA [in Japanese] (Tokyo: JICA, 2004), pp. 3 and 19. 
45 Masakazu Sakashita, Media assistance for conflict prevention [in Japanese] (Tokyo: JICA Research 
Institute, 2006); NHK International, Information gathering and assurance for the capacity building of 
the media for governance assistance in the African region [in Japanese] (Tokyo: JICA, March 2012). 
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and South Sudan (2012–18). However, weakness in terms of the substance of such assistance for 
the promotion of democracy remains. First, Japan does not provide media assistance to print 
media, such as newspapers and magazines, as it regards telecommunications and broadcasting 
technology as its comparative advantage, and thus the content of Japan’s media assistance is 
mostly technical.46  Second, the targets of Japan’s media assistance are state-owned stations, 
hence it does not help nurture independent media. This shows that Japan’s media assistance also 
takes a regime-compatible approach. 
 
Figure 2 Gross disbursements of Japan’s ODA for radio and television (1995–2016) 
(Unit: US Dollar, Millions, 2016) 
 
Source: 22030: Radio/Television/Print media in the OECD, Creditor Reporting System (data extracted 
on November 2, 2018). 
 
Similar to Indonesia, Japan prefers using technical terminology rather than the umbrella 
term “democracy” to describe its projects.47  However, although the Japanese government has 
increasingly identified support for democracy as a long-term purpose for its aid projects, many 
of those projects have content that assists governance, rather than democracy. This is largely 
because JICA’s mandate is for development assistance, and JICA is, therefore, inclined to pursue 
non-political projects.48  Greater focus on regime-compatible sectors can be explained from this 
perspective as well. This is slightly different from the Indonesian case, where the IPD as a 
                                            
46 Sakashita, Media assistance for conflict prevention, p. 122. 
47 See JICA, Towards democratic state-building assistance [in Japanese] (Tokyo, JICA, 2003), pp. 98–
110. 
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non-governmental organization, in addition to governmental organizations, functions as an 
institution for the support of democracy. 
 
2.2.2 Diplomatic/Economic Measures 
While Japan has used diplomatic/economic measures of democracy promotion as well, the 
trend in such measures does not match perfectly with the increased emphasis on democracy in 
the Japanese government’s discourse. This is because the government has consistently placed 
importance on dialogue for promoting democracy, and because Japan’s values-based 
diplomacy since the mid-2000s has promoted democracy through ODA provision, and not 
through the use of negative measures such as diplomatic pressure and economic sanctions. 
Japan has used persuasion to urge a return to democracy since the 1990s, and the 
emergence of its values-based diplomacy initiative has not fostered any change in this 
approach. Such actions were taken vis-à-vis incidents including the parliamentary suspension 
in Peru in 1992; the coups d’état in Fiji, Mauritania, Thailand, and Venezuela in the 2000s; the 
human rights abuses in Sudan in 2003; the crackdown on citizens’ demonstrations in Thailand 
and Uzbekistan in the 1990s and 2000s; and the political killing of journalists in the 
Philippines in 2006.49   
A recent example comes from Cambodia in 2018. Given that Prime Minister Hun Sen 
had dissolved the opposition party before that year’s general election, it was going to be 
non-competitive. Japan’s Prime Minister Shinzo Abe, Foreign Affairs Minister Taro Kono, and 
other high-ranking officials in the cabinet and the Ministry of Foreign Affairs repeatedly 
visited Cambodia and persuaded Hun Sen to give amnesty to the members of the Cambodia 
National Rescue Party (the dissolved opposition party), have dialogue with them, and give 
                                                                                                                                
48 Ichihara, Japan’s international democracy assistance as soft power, chapter 5. 
49 Koichi Sugiura, Democracy support [in Japanese] (Tokyo: Horitsu bunka sha, 2010), pp. 202–203; 
Yasutami Shimomura, ‘The rise and fall of intervention in the Japanese aid policy’, paper submitted to 
the Japan Association of International Affairs Annual Conference, 14 Oct. 2016. 
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medical treatment to the party’s leader Kem Sokha.50  However, given that the election was 
going to be conducted without any major opposition party in spite of Japan’s urging, Japan 
decided not to dispatch election observers or endorse the election.51  
On the other hand, when there is outright suppression of pro-democracy forces and 
human rights, Japan has shown reluctance in the application of sanction measures. This has 
especially been the case regarding suppression of anti-democratic incidents in countries where 
Japan has high stakes. While Japan applied economic sanctions following the coups d’état in 
Haiti, Guatemala, Gambia, Niger, Zambia, and Côte d’Ivoire from the 1990s to the 2000s,52  
it showed hesitation in joining sanctions after the crackdown on pro-democracy forces in 
Burma and China in the late 1980s. After being criticized for its tepid stance and eventually 
joining in sanctions, Japan moved to persuade Western countries to lift these at an early stage.  
This stance comes from Japanese policy-makers’ belief that the application of outright 
pressure could lead to the loss of a communication channel for continuous dialogue and 
persuasion and could be counterproductive. A high-ranking official of JICA said “We won’t be 
able to exert any impact by saying “you are not democracy” when a country’s democracy is in 
crisis”.53  Furthermore, due to the rise of China as a major donor, Japanese officials are afraid 
that other countries might walk away from Japan and approach China if Japan applies too 
much pressure. Japan’s pressure is therefore softer and continues for a much shorter period 
than is the case for Western democracies. For example, although Japan showed its regret and 
urged a return to democracy at the time of the coup d’état in Thailand in 2014, such statements 
stopped appearing within a year.54  And, while Foreign Minister Taro Kono told the Foreign 
                                            
50 From high-ranking officials of MOFA and the Cabinet, in interviews with the author, 10 and 26 July 
2018. 
51 ‘Japan won’t be sending election monitors to Cambodia’, Reuters, 25 July 2018. 
52 Sugiura, Democracy support, pp. 202–203. 
53 From a high-ranking official of JICA, in an interview with the author, 25 July 2018. 
54 Maiko Ichihara et al., Asian democracies and Thailand’s military takeover, Carnegie Endowment for 
International Peace, 13 Oct. 2015, pp. 1–2. 
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Minister of Cambodia Prak Sokhonn after the 2018 Cambodian general election that Japan 
regretted the election and urged Cambodia to engage in democratic political processes,55  the 
Secretary General of the Liberal Democratic Party, Toshihiro Nikai, sent a letter to Prime 
Minister Hun Sen on 10 August 2018 that “sincerely congratulated the overwhelming victory” 
of Hun Sen’s party in the general election.56  So, whether it is in the case of the Rohingya 
issue in Myanmar or the extrajudicial killings in the Philippines, Japan retains a soft touch. 
Overall, although Japan’s values-based diplomacy has expanded its assistance for democracy 
in the form of ODA, the country thus remains diplomatically and economically hesitant about 
the use of negative sanction measures.  
Recent years have witnessed a critical assessment of the regime-compatible approach 
of the Japanese government, stemming from within the Japanese society. Two notable 
examples are the Democracy for the Future project at the Japan Center for International 
Exchange, and the Study Group on Japan’s Development Assistance and Peacebuilding 
(originally called the Experts Group for the Reconsideration of Japan’s ODA and Democracy), 
both of which were established in 2018. Both seek ways to upgrade Japan’s assistance for 
democracy from the regime-compatible approach (which could end up supporting a regime, be 
it democratic or authoritarian). However, tangible change has yet to be observed in Japan’s 
assistance measures. 
In sum, the support for democracy of Japan and Indonesia has its differences. While 
Japan’s ODA amount for democracy and governance between 2000 and 2015 was US$4,500 
million, Indonesia’s total ODA to all sectors including not only democracy but also all else 
during the same period was only US$57.4 million. This shows that Japan is a much greater 
player in the field compared to Indonesia. However, Japan takes a more regime-compatible 
                                            
55 MOFA, ‘Japan–Cambodia foreign ministers’ meeting’, 4 Aug. 2018, 
https://www.mofa.go.jp/s_sa/sea1/kh/page3e_000895.html 
56 ‘Cambodia is increasingly approaching China’ [in Japanese], Yomiuri Shimbun, 18 Aug. 2018, p. 9. 
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approach than Indonesia when it comes to civil society support, and this difference seems to be 
caused by the presence/absence of democracy support institutions (Indonesia has IPD while 
Japan does not). 
Despite these differences, similarities between Japan and Indonesia in their support for 
democracy abound. Not only did they both begin support for democracy in the mid-2000s, they 
have both intentionally taken a regime-compatible approach. Sanctions and 
naming-and-shaming are not their preferred strategies; instead, they prefer face-saving and 
maintaining dialogue. Preferring a low-key approach, they avoid the use of the term 
“democracy” in their support and instead employ more technical terms. 
Then why did Japan and Indonesia upgrade their support for democracy at a similar 
time in the 2000s? Have these motivations impacted on their approach to the support of 
democracy as well? The next section examines the impact of norms and strategic calculations 
on the support for democracy offered by Indonesia and Japan. 
 
3. Motives for Democracy Support  
3.1 Indonesia 
3.1.1 Impact of Democratic Norms 
The rate of public support for democracy in Indonesia has been strong since the country’s 
democratization. In the East-Asia Barometer survey conducted in Indonesia in 2006, 73.6% of 
respondents answered that “democracy is always preferable to any other kind of government”, 
and 89.6% disapproved of the statement that “we should get rid of parliament and elections and 
have a strong leader decide things.”57  
High-ranking officials such as Susilo Bambang Yudhoyono, Hassan Wirajuda, Marty 
Natalegawa, Marzuki Darusman, and Makarim Wibisono have shown normative support for 
                                            
57 East Asia Barometer, Indonesia (2006). 
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democracy and human rights. In a speech at the United Nations General Assembly in 2001, 
Hassan Wirajuda stated, “We Indonesians have a natural affinity to democracy.” 58  These 
officials understand that the Indonesian constitution mandates participation in peace and 
development, which serves as a legal basis for the support of democracy.59  The BDF’s vision 
states that “democracy, as enshrined in the value system of Pancasila as the philosophy of the 
nation, needs to be projected in Indonesia’s foreign policy”.60  President Yudhoyono underlined 
Indonesia’s role as a “norm setter” in international society in his speech in 2012 at the Foreign 
Commonwealth Office in London.61   
Indonesian civil society is vibrant and has voiced its concern about the human rights and 
democracy situation in the Asian region. It opposed the adopted ASEAN Charter, arguing that 
the protection of human rights and democracy had been watered down.62  The Jakarta Post has 
published a large number of op-eds that advocate the support of democracy. Thus, there seems to 
be a consensus among both governmental and non-governmental actors in Indonesia that the 
support of democracy is a natural extension of democratic norms in the country. 
However, democracy in Indonesia is still developing. Freedom House rated Indonesia 
only “partly free” until 2004. Although it rated the country “free” from 2005 to 2012, 
Indonesia’s civil liberty and political rights scores remained 3 and 2, respectively (out of 7, with 
1 being the most free).63  Corruption has been a serious issue in the country, and Transparency 
                                            
58 Hassan Wirajuda, ‘The democratic response’, presented at 56th Session of the UN General Assembly, 
New York, 15 November 2001. 
59 From high-ranking officials of the South–South and Triangular Technical Cooperation Division, 
SETNEG, in an interview with the author, 30 August 2017. 
60 KEMLU, ‘Why do we need to have the Bali Democracy Forum?’, 2017, 
https://bdf.kemlu.go.id/22Q-buy_NFu3.html 
61 Wilton Park, ‘President Yudhoyono’s speech at our annual address’, 5 Nov. 2012, 
https://www.wiltonpark.org.uk/president-yudhoyonos-speech-at-our-annual-address/ 
62 Anwar, ‘The impact of domestic and Asian regional changes’, p. 134. 
63 Freedom House, Freedom in the world: Country and territory ratings and statuses, 1973-2019. 
Washington, DC: Freedom House, 2019. 
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International ranked Indonesia approximately 130th out of 140–160 countries in the mid-2000s 
(with higher ranks being the least corrupt).64   
Scholars such as Rizal Sukma argue that Indonesia’s democracy is not full-fledged to 
the extent that it causes a normative commitment to the support of democracy.65  Although there 
seems to be some slight correlation between improvements in domestic democracy and external 
support for democracy in the mid-2000s, a high support rate for democracy among the public as 
well as public statements by high-ranking officials praising democracy appeared in the early 
2000s as well; thus, a comparative analysis that includes strategic factors is essential. 
 
3.1.2 Impact of Strategic Considerations 
Since the very beginning when the Indonesian government started reflecting democracy in its 
foreign policy during the Habibie administration, democracy diplomacy has been regarded as a 
strategic tool. Sukma argues that the Habibie administration emphasized democracy to justify 
its administration, and the Megawati administration aimed to regain international trust in 
Indonesia after the economic and political turmoil experienced during the Asian Financial 
Crisis.66  For the Habibie and Megawati administrations, legitimacy was the purpose of their 
democratic emphasis.  
While both the Yudhoyono administration and the administrations before it aimed to 
use democracy for greater legitimacy, it was only during the Yudhoyono administration that 
Indonesia began supporting democracy abroad. To turn democratic norms into Indonesia’s 
diplomatic asset, Wirajuda took the initiative by reforming KEMLU, establishing the 
                                            
64 Transparency International, Corruption perception index 2018. Berlin: Transparency International, 
2018. 
65 Sukma, ‘Do new democracies support democracy?’, p. 121. 
66 Sukma, Do new democracies support democracy? pp. 111–12. 
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Directorate of Information and Public Diplomacy, and by giving discretion to ambassadors to 
promote “moderate Islam and liberal values as part of their public diplomacy efforts.”67  
The discourse related to Indonesia’s international cooperation, in general, shows that 
around this time Indonesia began seeking greater influence in the world. The Mid-Term 
Development Plan 2004–2009, which determined the basis of the strategic plans of the 
Indonesian ministries and government agencies, defined one of Indonesia’s foreign policies as 
follows: “To enhance Indonesia’s image and promote the achievements of implementing 
democratic principles, civil freedom and the movement for gender equality in Indonesia.”68  
The Grand Design for SSTC in 2011–25 states that Indonesia intends to promote its role and 
national interests through the use of SSTC.69  The KEMLU states that the purposes of 
Indonesia’s international cooperation include “advancing the role of Indonesia in South–South 
and triangular cooperation according to the needs and national interests” and supporting “the 
implementation of Indonesian diplomacy to improve cooperation and wider interest in the 
framework of bilateral, regional, and multilateral cooperation.”70  Given that democracy 
support was positioned as a tool for international cooperation, there was no way but to choose 
a regime-compatible approach. 
The shift in Indonesia’s stance on democracy support appears to reflect its 
self-confidence, which stems from the attainment of domestic stability after democratization. 
Two factors seem to have prompted Indonesia’s desire to expand its international influence: 
G20 membership and middle-income-country status. Awidya Santikajaya argues that 
Indonesia’s membership of the G20, established in 2008, prompted the government to expand 
                                            
67 Nabbs-Keller, Reforming Indonesia’s foreign ministry, p. 69. 
68 Republic of Indonesia, ‘Presidential regulation number 7 of 2005 on the National Medium-Term 
Development Plan 200 –2009, reprinted by BAPPENAS’, chapter 8-4, 
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its international influence and create strategic foreign policies for this purpose. He notes that 
the speeches and statements of President Yudhoyono changed around this time and began 
showing Indonesia’s willingness to play a greater role on the international scene.71  The 
World Bank’s categorization in 2010 of Indonesia as a middle-income country led to a greater 
emphasis on development cooperation. Dewi Fortuna Anwar argues that its 
middle-income-country status gave Indonesia the self-confidence that it had not only recovered 
from the Asian Financial Crisis but had also managed to limit the impact of the global financial 
crisis of 2008, and this self-confidence was projected onto Indonesia’s foreign policy.72  
Regarding development cooperation as a foreign policy tool, the Indonesian government 
intended to expand its influence in international society and especially the Global South. With 
this diplomatic approach, support for democracy was considered a justifiable tool that could be 
closely connected with the country’s own experience of democratization and democratic 
identity.73  
This self-recognition as an emerging great power accompanied Indonesia’s analysis of 
international structural changes. Shada Islam argues that the country’s foreign policy circle 
cautiously calculated the potential for Indonesia’s influence beyond ASEAN given the 
international power shift between emerging powers such as China and India and the remaining 
great powers such as the US, Japan, and Russia. 74   Indonesia intended to expand its 
international influence to match its relative power on the international scene, and support for 
democracy was considered by the foreign policy circle in the country to be one potential policy 
tool for this purpose. A KEMLU official stated in an interview with the author that support for 
democracy is regarded as a policy tool that has the potential to increase Indonesia’s chances of 
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74 Shada Islam, ‘Indonesia’s rise: implications for Asia and Europe,’ European View 10, 2011, p. 168. 
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gaining membership even in the United Nations Security Council. 75  Thus, along with 
Indonesia’s rise, the tectonic shift in the international power structure prompted the country to 
seek ways to exert the influence that it feels it deserves as a middle-income country. 
Accordingly, the structural change on the international system level impacted on Indonesia’s 
strategic motivation. 
 
3.2 Japan 
3.2.1 Impact of Democratic Norms 
Democracy itself has taken deep root within Japanese society, although it was foreign to the 
country originally. Longing for freedom and liberty spread widely in Japanese society after the 
Second World War. Using the words of political scientist Masao Maruyama, what people 
experienced during the world wars was “transfers of repression” whereby people were 
repressed at every level of the social hierarchy—be it in the military, in factories, or in 
schools—within a “system of irresponsibility” where nobody took responsibility for such 
repression.76  Social scientists, activists, and commentators in the post–world war era called 
for civil liberties to make citizens responsible individuals. Writings of pro-democracy thinkers 
garnered sympathy and support within the broader Japanese society. When the journal Sekai 
containing Maruyama’s above-mentioned argument was published in 1946, it went out of stock 
immediately.77  Such democratic norms emerged endogenously and were not forced by the 
US. As Eiji Oguma argues, activists such as Fusae Ichikawa, scholars such as Iwao Koyama, 
and writers such as Eiji Yoshikawa called for media freedom, freedom of assemblies, and the 
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right to speech in the immediate aftermath of the Second World War before the US implanted 
democracy in Japan.78  
While some scholars argue that Japanese foreign policies have had pragmatic or 
mercantile characteristics,79  the mercantile approach under the Yoshida doctrine has been 
maintained partially as a result of the activism of pro-democracy actors. These actors opposed 
the expansion of Japan’s security role due to its unconstitutionality, and they raised their voices 
to confront issues of weak transparency and civilian control in policy decision-making 
processes. Although people’s trust in social movements became weak due to the terrorist 
activities of extremist groups of the new left in the latter half of the Cold War, social 
movements returned to the political scene after this period on occasions such as the enactment 
of the Peacekeeping Operations Cooperation Act in 1991 (which allowed the dispatch of 
self-defence forces to United Nations peacekeeping operations) and the Iraq Special Measures 
Act in 2003 (which facilitated the dispatch of self-defence forces to Iraq), among others, 
questioning the constitutionality of such acts. Opposition was grounded on democratic 
institutions and procedures being disrespected. This shows that democratic norms are deeply 
embedded in the Japanese society, and impact on the country’s foreign policies. 
Although the Japanese public in general are not ardent supporters of the promotion of 
democracy, support for this has risen over the years. In the annual opinion survey of the 
Cabinet Bureau, the percentage of respondents who consider that Japan should support other 
countries for universal values, including democracy, has been rising since 2006 and has mostly 
been above 35 per cent since 2012 (Figure 3). Although this support rate is still not high, the 
change is substantial. 
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Figure 3 Public support rate for democracy promotion in Japan (1992–2017) 
 
Note: The wording of the question until 2006 was whether Japan should engage in “international 
cooperation for the protection of universal values such as freedom, democracy, and human rights”, and 
since 2007 has been whether Japan should engage in “international cooperation for the promotion of 
universal values such as freedom, democracy, basic human rights, and the rule of law”. 
Source: Cabinet Office, “Public Opinion Survey on Diplomacy” [in Japanese]. 
 
While public support corresponds to the timing of emergence of values-based 
diplomacy in Japan, it seems to have been following the agenda set by the government, and not 
vice versa. Belief in democracy itself has not shown any substantial rise, and even a slight 
decline can be observed over the years. The World Value Survey raised the same question on 
whether democracy is a good form of government for the respondent’s country in 2000, 2005, 
and 2010, and the percentage of those who agreed (“strongly agree” and “agree” combined) 
has declined gradually from 79.9% to 77.8% and then to 72.0% over time.80  Although this 
decline is subtle and does not constitute a meaningful change, it does not correspond with the 
Japanese people’s increasing support for the promotion of democracy, and thus shows that 
commitment to democratic norms is not an explanatory factor for the citizens support in this 
area. 
                                            
80 The question wordings in World Value Survey are ‘I’m going to describe various types of political 
systems and ask what you think about each as a way of governing this country…. Having a democratic 
political system’. Ronald Inglehart et al., eds., World values survey: all rounds - country-pooled datafile 
version (Madrid: JD Systems Institute, 2014), 
http://www.worldvaluessurvey.org/WVSDocumentationWVL.jsp 
 
31 
 
Furthermore, policy-makers hold a restrained view about the desirability of a sense of 
obligation to promote democracy. Despite the officially expressed sense of obligation, there is 
a consensus among policy-makers that it is only domestic people who are entitled to change 
their political system. While the spontaneity of democratization itself is an internationally 
shared view, some high-ranking officials even have the understanding that as long as 
governments are chosen by elections, external actors do not have the right to intervene even if 
policies violate civil liberties. They view the Western democracy promotion whereby Europe 
and the US provide support to anti-governmental groups critically, and consider that outsiders 
should not seek to empower certain groups. In their understanding, holding a sense of 
obligation to promote democracy could lead to attempts at the undesirable imposition of 
democracy and ultimately to causing instability.81  Therefore, despite the stable support for 
democracy and the sense of obligation to promote it shown in official documents, it is difficult 
to find a surge of democratic norms driving Japan towards the promotion of democracy. 
 
3.2.2 Impact of Strategic Considerations 
Japan’s motivation towards the promotion of democracy seem to have instead had more to do 
with strategic considerations. The fact that Japan’s commitment to the promotion of democracy 
initially appeared not as an initiative to spread democracy around the world but to create an 
“arc” of democratic and wealthy countries implies that Japan intended to show the 
compatibility of Japanese diplomacy with that of the US, to strengthen trust between the two 
countries. Aso’s use of the term “arc” indicates that he was positioning this approach alongside 
                                            
81 ‘JICA’s approach: governance assistance which emphasizes proactive and spontaneous process’ [in 
Japanese], Monthly JICA, July 2007, pp. 18–19; from JICA officials, in an interview with the author, 11 
Nov. 2008; from an advisor of the prime minister, in an interview with the author, 10 July 2018; from a 
high-ranking official in the cabinet, in an interview with the author, 11 July 2018; from a high-ranking 
official of MOFA, in an interview with the author, 19 July 2018; from high-ranking officials of MOFA, 
in an interview with the author, 26 July 2018; and from high-ranking officials of JICA, in an interview 
with the author, 25 July 2018. 
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the concept of the “Arc of Instability” the US Department of Defence used in its Quadrennial 
Defence Review Report 2001.82  The concept continued to be used among defence officials in 
the US due to terrorism around the world in the 2000s, leading Japan to adjust its policies to 
US security policy realignments based on the arc concept. The AFP was an initiative intended 
to turn the arc of instability into one of freedom and prosperity, and was positioned as the other 
side of the same coin as the US strategy. 83  That was why Tomohiko Taniguchi, the 
speechwriter for Prime Minister Shinzo Abe, stated that “the Arc of Freedom and Prosperity 
was, from its beginning, a policy not so much of substantiation as of declaration” and attested 
that “the AFP policy was Tokyo’s “branding” exercise from the outset. Its central aim was to 
establish Japan’s democratic identity and cement its credentials as a reliable partner for the US 
and other peer democracies, thereby widening its strategic position.”84   
However, the US factor alone is not sufficient in explaining Japan’s commitment to 
promoting democracy given that the regional coverages of the Arc of Instability (from the 
Middle East to Northeast Asia) and that of the AFP (“from Northeast Asia to Central Asia and 
the Caucasus, Turkey, Central and Eastern Europe and the Baltic states”) do not perfectly 
correspond.85  In addition, in his AFP speech, Aso mentioned the US only three times, while 
he mentioned countries in the regions of Central and Eastern Europe, Central Asia, and 
Indochina more often.86   
The promotion of democracy to Central and Eastern European countries was intuitive, 
given that they democratized in the 1990s and were still in the process of consolidation. On the 
other hand, however, there was no such move toward democratization in Central Asia and 
                                            
82 US Department of Defence, ‘Quadrennial defence review report 2001’, 30 Sep. 2001, p. 4. 
83 Yoshikatsu Suzuki, ‘New diplomatic strategy’ [in Japanese], Sekai shuho, Dec. 2006, pp. 17–18. 
84 Tomohiko Taniguchi, Beyond ‘The Arc of Freedom and Prosperity’ (Washington DC: The German 
Marshall Fund of the United States, 2010), p. 2. 
85 US Department of Defence, ‘Quadrennial defence review report 2001’, p. 4; MOFA, ‘Arc of Freedom 
and Prosperity’. 
86 MOFA, ‘Arc of Freedom and Prosperity’. 
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Indochina. These were regions where violations of political rights and civil liberties were 
observed, and Japan found such political instabilities to be issues when seeking pragmatic 
interest. Many countries in the region showed impressive GDP growth rates in the 2000s, and 
together with rich natural resources, their economies were attractive for Japan, which was 
seeking ways to overcome the long-lasting economic recession and to bring up its relative 
position as a major power in the international structure. 
Terrorism in Afghanistan was considered to potentially attract Islamic fundamentalists 
in Central Asia due to geographical proximity. Central Asian oppressive authoritarianism was 
causing the rise of anti-governmental movements and Islamic fundamentalists alike. Serious 
violations of political rights and civil liberties in the mid-2000s, therefore, concerned Japanese 
policy-makers. In Uzbekistan, the government was alleged to have oppressed participants of 
anti-governmental protests in 2005. Election fraud was observed in Kyrgyz in the same year, 
and was followed by anti-governmental movements and the overthrow of the Askar Akayev 
administration. Japan repeatedly expressed concern about these issues, and lawmakers and 
intellectuals alike urged the Japanese government to promote democracy and market economy 
to countries in the region for stability.87  Thus, when the dialogue of “Central Asia Plus Japan” 
was held in 2006, Vice Foreign Affairs Minister Yasuhisa Shiozaki emphasized the importance 
of consolidating basic values such as democracy and human rights. 88   Support for 
democratization became a part of the package of support for this region in this way, with the 
long-term interest of stabilization of access to natural resources.  
Political stability was important for economic activities in Indochina as well. While 
Japanese investment moved from Southeast Asia to China in the 1990s and 2000s, 
                                            
87 See, for example, Japan Institute of International Affairs, Proposal concerning Central Asia, Mar. 
2003, https://www2.jiia.or.jp/pdf/russia_centre/h14_c-asia/03_kasai.pdf; Statement of Shuji Kira, 
member of the House of Representatives, in the Committee on Economy, Trade, and Industry, 26 Oct. 
2005. 
88 MOFA, Central Asia Plus Japan” dialogue: the first Tokyo dialogue, 30 Mar. 2006, 
https://www.mofa.go.jp/mofaj/press/event/caj_summary.html 
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overdependence on China for labour-intensive industries, in addition to the rise of wages in 
China and repeated anti-Japan riots in the country, increased a concern in Japan by the 
mid-2000s that Japanese companies need to seek “China plus one” destinations for investment. 
Indochina countries, especially Cambodia, Laos, and Vietnam, were considered to be desirable 
for that purpose due to their relatively low wages.89  However, political instability in the 
region was a concern. After the Sam Rainsy Party won 22% of the seats in the Cambodian 
general election in 2003, leaders of the party were deprived of immunity from arrest; Cheam 
Channy was placed under arrest and Sam Rainsy was forced to flee the country. In 
neighbouring Myanmar, military control continued even after the roadmap to democracy was 
released in 2003, a year that also marked the start of Aung San Suu Kyi’s third period of house 
arrest. While using economic and diplomatic measures to promote democracy by maintaining 
economic sanctions and urging democratization in Myanmar, as well as showing concern about 
the treatment of opposition party leaders in Cambodia, Japan intended to contain risks and 
improve predictability of the business environment in Indochina with foreign aid.90   
What further increased the importance of Central Asia and Indochina for Japan was 
that competition between Japan and China was escalating in these regions. While Japan was 
one of the first countries to recognize the Central Asian countries in 1991 and has since 
actively strengthened cooperative relations, China became active in cooperating with these 
countries in the mid-1990s. China first appeared in 1996 with the Shanghai Five, which was 
formalized as the Shanghai Cooperation Organization in 2001. Given the active engagement of 
China in the region, Japan upgraded its own engagement in Central Asia: it launched a regional 
diplomacy initiative in 1997 and started the Central Asia Plus Japan dialogue in 2004. Stability 
of governance and friendly relations with Japan were thus considered to be of strategic 
                                            
89 From an advisor of the prime minister, in an interview with the author, 10 July 2018. 
90 MOFA, Global management and the mission for Japanese diplomacy, 18 May 2007, 
https://www.mofa.go.jp/announce/fm/aso/address0705.html. 
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importance for Japan in maintaining substantial political influence at the time of fierce political 
competition with China.  
The China factor was a serious concern given the increase in that country’s economic 
and military capabilities. Both its military expenditure and its GDP were rapidly reaching the 
level of Japan in the early 2000s, and China’s political influence and assertiveness were also 
expanding. Table 1 details the number of press conferences given by the Japanese Foreign 
Minister that mentioned China and democracy. As can be seen in the table, there was no 
mention either of China or of democracy in much of the latter half of the 1990s. However, 
mention of both began appearing in 1999. Although there are too few mentions of democracy 
to find statistical correlations, the table shows that concerns about both China and democracy 
rose throughout the 2000s. There was a rising sense of urgency on the side of Japan that it must 
improve predictability and maintain the international status quo, and such concerns were 
reflected in its policies on the support of democracy. Facing the rise of China and the relative 
decline of Japan in the international power structure, such a strategic motivation naturally led 
Japan to seek a regime-compatible approach, thus it used support for democracy as a foreign 
policy tool to expand cooperation with other countries and bring stability based on the 
principles it upholds along with the other OECD countries. 
 
Table 1 Number of press conferences given by the Foreign Minister of Japan that 
mentioned China and democracy 
 
Mentions 1995 1996 1997 1998 1999 2000 2001 2002 2003 2004 2005 2006 2007 2008 2009 2010 
China 0 0 0 0 4 125 61 165 108 178 148 196 156 291 218 654 
Democracy 0 0 0 0 2 4 2 8 1 1 4 4 10 2 4 22 
 
Source: Created by the author based on MOFA, Record on Foreign Minister’s Press Conference: 
Summary [in Japanese], www.mofa.go.jp/mofaj/press/kaiken/fuku/index.html#archives 
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In sum, as in the case of Indonesia, strategic motives drove Japan to use support for 
democracy as a foreign policy tool, mainly to strengthen its relations with the United States, to 
help foster political and economic stability in neighbouring countries, and to expand access to 
neighbouring markets and natural resources. Such necessities were facilitated in the 2000s by 
international power shifts. On the one hand, the Japanese economy stagnated in the 1990s and 
2000s, and the US wasted its military and economic capabilities in the war against Iraq and the 
post-conflict reconstruction of that country. On the other hand, China’s economic and military 
power expanded steadily and substantially, which caused a relative decline of the power of the 
US and Japan. This international power shift not only invigorated Japan’s desire to recover its 
economy, it also made it necessary for Japan to seek a new tool with which to bring stability 
and predictability to the politics and economy of neighbouring countries and to maintain its 
political influence, while strengthening its alliance with the US. Thus, the international power 
shift played the role of independent variable in the case of Japan as well, and strategic 
incentives remained the intervening variable. In addition, given that maintaining good relations 
with recipient governments was a necessity in line with these strategic motives, Japan took a 
regime-compatible approach to the support of democracy. 
 
4. Conclusion 
Indonesia and Japan, which have traditionally taken sovereignty-weighted approaches in their 
foreign policies, began emphasizing support for democracy in the mid-2000s. A significant 
commonality is that both countries emphasize lesson-sharing and dialogue, and both have the 
tendency to take engagement measures. They also prefer technical terminologies as frames for 
their projects to avoid the impression of interference in domestic affairs. Differences between 
the two countries are, first, the ODA amount for this sector, and second, that the ratio of 
Indonesia’s assistance provided to non-regime-compatible sectors seems slightly greater 
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compared to that of Japan. The former difference is due to disparity in the size of the economy in 
the two countries. The latter difference seems to be facilitated by the existence of the IPD as an 
NGO actor in democracy assistance in Indonesia, whereas it was JICA that played the central 
role in assisting democracy in the case of Japan. Yet, Indonesia’s focus on lesson-sharing and 
dialogue leads the country to adopt a regime-compatible approach in general, just as in the case 
of Japan. Thus, the two countries commonly use regime-compatible approaches, and they have 
not necessarily relaxed their sovereignty-weighted approach.  
In analysing the impact of norms and strategic calculations on the two countries’ 
commencement of support for democracy at almost the same time, this study found substantial 
normative support among their citizens for both democracy and the support of democracy. 
However, the increases and decreases in such support do not necessarily correspond with the 
timing of the emergence of support for democracy in the two countries. The public and elites 
alike have shown strong support for democracy since the early 2000s in Indonesia. In Japan, 
while democratic norms have been deep rooted, they have been manifested in domestic 
democracy and not a push for democracy abroad. In addition, the commitment to democratic 
norms has been stable and has not expanded to constitute a drive for the promotion of democracy. 
Although official statements describe democracy in normative terms and show a sense of 
obligation to promote democracy, policy-makers share a consensus that external actors should 
not intervene to nurture democracy. Democratic norms, therefore, do not have a substantial 
explanatory power in explaining the two countries’ promotion of democracy. Although 
normative support for democracy has been an imperative as a background, it is not an 
independent variable for the emergence of support for democracy. 
Rather, the two countries commonly began using support for democracy strategically as 
a foreign policy tool in the 2000s. The Yudoyono administration intended to use its support of 
democracy to expand Indonesia’s influence in the world, while the Abe administration intended 
to use it to strengthen Japan’s ties with the US and expand the country’s influence vis-à-vis 
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China. At the same time, Japan had pragmatic interests in promoting democracy. With the high 
risk of political instability in Central Asia at the time of the rise of terrorism in Afghanistan, 
Japan sought to help bring the rule of law and greater political transparency to the region. In 
Indochina, Japan also intended to enhance the predictability of the business environment for the 
sake of those Japanese companies considering this region for their “China plus one” strategy. 
The source of these strategic motivations was not solely domestic. Rather, they were 
prompted by a change of the international power structure. Indonesia, as a rising power, intended 
to use support for democracy to expand its influence to match its status as a middle-income and 
G20 member country. On the other hand, as an existing major power facing a weakened relative 
power position given the rise of China, Japan considered support for democracy would expand 
its political influence vis-à-vis China to help preserve the status quo. The relative decline of the 
US in the 2000s due to the Iraq war (and the financial crisis in the late 2000s) caused tectonic 
shifts in the international power structure that have intensified power politics. Countries with 
power positions that have drastically changed in relative terms have sought new ways to expand 
their political influence. 
 
Table 2 Path Diagrams of the Study 
<Path Diagram before Hypothesis-Testing> 
Democratic norms   
Democracy support 
Strategic concerns   
     
<Path Diagram after Hypothesis-Testing> 
International power structure  Strategic concerns   Democracy support 
Source: Author. 
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As Table 2 shows, this study tested the impact of democratic norms and strategic 
concerns and their impact on democracy support. The hypotheses-testing revealed two things: 
First, while the impact of strategic concerns was tested positively, democratic norms were 
found not to be a variable but more an environmental factor. Second, strategic concerns were 
found to be motivated by the international power structure, which was an omitted variable in 
the original hypotheses, and is the true independent variable here. 
This result implies that any country with democratic norms and a change in its relative 
power position in the international power structure (either downward or upward) could have a 
strategic motivation to use democracy support for political influence. This might not apply if a 
country’s power is too small, but it could apply to any major rising or declining power. The 
conclusion drawn from this pilot study should be tested against other third-generation 
democracy promoters for theory creation. This will be the task for future research. 
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Abstract (In Japanese) 
要約 
 
東アジア諸国は伝統的に、外交政策において民主主義・人権規範よりも国家主権を重
視してきた。しかし 2000 年代半ばに入り、こうした主権重視アプローチに変化の兆し
が見られ始めた。日本とインドネシアという東アジアの二カ国が民主化支援を重視し
始め、民主化に関する経験共有や、民主的制度の運営に必要な技術・物資・資金の提
供を開始したのである。本稿は、本研究を（これら二カ国を含む）第三世代の民主化
支援アクターに関するパイロットスタディと位置づけ、これら二カ国による民主化支
援の現状と動機を分析する。 
本稿の分析結果は以下の通りである。日本とインドネシアの民主化支援は開始時期の
みならず支援内容においても類似性を有しており、両国はともに体制適合的アプロー
チ（regime-compatible approach）を取っていた。また、両国を民主化支援に駆り立てた
要因に関する分析の結果、民主主義規範は説明変数ではなく背景要因に留まり、戦略
的動機が介在していることが明らかとなった。インドネシアは国際的地位の向上に合
わせて国際的影響力拡大を目的に、日本は国際的地位の低下を受けて国際的影響力の
維持・拡大を目的に、民主化支援を外交ツールとして利用し始めたのである。つまり、
両国の戦略的動機は媒介変数であり、国際パワー構造の変動が独立変数として機能し
ていた。 
 
キーワード：民主化支援、国際パワー構造、戦略的動機、民主主義規範、ODA、体制
適合的アプローチ、日本、インドネシア 
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